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Detecting Bias: Using Statistical Evidence to
Establish Intentional Discrimination in Racial
Profiling Cases
Nicola Persico
t
andDavid A. Castlemanf

In ordering an investigation into possible racial profiling,
President Clinton condemned the practice as "the opposite of
good police work where actions are based on hard facts, not
stereotypes."' But precisely what police work should be considered lawful because based on "hard facts," as opposed to unlawful
because based on "stereotypes"? Some participants in the public
debate argue that any racial disparity in law enforcement should
be impermissible, while others are willing to tolerate some disparity as long as it does not stem from racial bias and it improves
the effectiveness of policing.2 From a legal viewpoint, ascertaining the extent to which an observed disparity reflects bias is a
key requirement in racial profiling litigation. In this paper we
report on recent contributions in the field of economics that make
progress in this direction.
The economic approach is based on a rational choice model of
policing and crime in which, under certain assumptions on the
incentives of agents, the existence of bias can be made empirically testable in a precise fashion. While the model is somewhat
f Stephen F. Goldstone Associate Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
ff J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Pennsylvania. The authors would like to thank
Professor Bernard Harcourt and the editors of the University of Chicago Legal Forum,
especially Angela Russo. The first author gratefully acknowledges conversations with
Professors John Knowles and Petra Todd: this paper draws on joint work with them.
Special thanks to Professor Chris Sanchirico for his very helpful comments. All errors are
our own.
1 Steven A. Holmes, Clinton Orders Investigation on PossibleRacial Proiing,NY
Times A22 (June 10, 1999).
2 Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy: RacialProfiingIsn't Usually Racist.It Can Help
Stop Crime. And It Should Be Abolished, New Republic 30-34 (Sept 13, 1999) (highlighting the differences between those who believe any use of racial characteristics should be
impermissible, and those who believe that using those characteristics "is an essential
weapon in the war on crime").
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complicated and technical, the underlying intuition is not. If two
groups are differently disposed to carry drugs, and police are
equally likely to search members of both groups, then searches of
the group with the greater criminal disposition (Group A) will be
more likely to yield contraband than searches of the group with
the lesser criminal disposition (Group B). In this case, we say
that the success rate, or hit rate, is higher in Group A than in
Group B. 3 The police therefore will invest more resources in the
higher probability searches of Group A, thus deterring additional
criminal activity among Group A members but failing to deter
Group B. This process will cause criminal activity in Group A to
fall until the hit rates for both groups are equal. However, if the
police are biased, they will further search the group against
which they are biased and create a disparity in the hit rates.
Thus, the proper way to determine the existence of bias in this
setup is to see if the hit rates are statistically different.
This paper provides an overview of the rational choice model
and describes an empirical test for bias that is consistent with
the approach taken in Anderson v Cornejo,4 a recent Seventh
Circuit opinion. We will proceed as follows: First, we will briefly
explain the issues involved in determining the legality of racial
disparities in policing, concentrating on the Fourteenth Amendment,5 which requires proof of intentional discrimination.6 We
then discuss the opinion in Anderson, which clarifies the requirements for proving intentional discrimination by making the
explicit distinction between search and hit rates.' Second, we
3 Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profilngand Drug
Interdiction on the H'ghway, 101 Mich L Rev 651, 667 (2002).
4 355 F3d 1021 (7th Cir 2004).
5 We do not focus on the Fourth Amendment. We are not aware of cases in which the
Fourth Amendment has been the basis of successful litigation, perhaps because of the
decision in Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 813 (1996) ("We of course agree with
petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment."). But see an interesting argument in Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling
and the Constitution,2002 U Chi Legal F 163, 268-69, proposing that the Court should
hold racial discrimination by the police unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
6 See Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 238 (1976) (noting that the unconstitutionality of a law under the Equal Protection Clause hinges on whether the law reflects a discriminatory purpose, not whether it has a racially disproportionate impact); Alschuler,
2002 U Chi Legal F at 177 (cited in note 5) (noting that, for the Supreme Court, only
purposeful discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause).
7 See Anderson, 355 F3d at 1024-25 (distinguishing between the search rates of
black women at an airport and the success rate in finding contraband on them in evaluating a racial profiling claim).
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explain the model we use to determine the existence of bias in
police searches. We show why disparities in search rates are not
helpful in determining whether there is intentional discrimination. We then demonstrate why disparities in hit rates should
establish an inference of discriminatory intent, consistent with
Anderson. Third, we illustrate our methodology using data from
the Maryland 1-95 Corridor, which have been analyzed both by
John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd ("KPT") and by
Samuel Gross and Katherine Barnes ("Gross and Barnes
(2002)"), 9 and discuss whether the data support the inference of
intentional discrimination.
I. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN POLICING AND EQUAL PROTECTION
In this Part, we will briefly explain the equal protection issues relevant to the model to be discussed in Part II. As such, we
are only concerned with how statistical evidence can be used to
establish the existence of racial discrimination where the relevant laws and policies are facially neutral.1 ° This paper does not
deal with the strict scrutiny analysis that might be triggered if
racial discrimination can be established.
In equal protection cases, disparate treatment (also referred
to as intentional discrimination), and not merely disparate impact, must be proven. 1 In Part I, we use our approach to propose
8 John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J Polit Econ 203 (2001) (analyzing the 1-95 data for
evidence of racial profiling).
9 See Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 658-60 (cited in note 3) (analyzing the I95 data for evidence of racial profiling).
10Thus, we assume that there is no law in the jurisdiction (typically a state) expressly condoning a policy of racial profiling, nor does the law enforcement agency have
such an express policy. Establishing discrimination facially would obviate the need for
this analysis.
11 An intent to discriminate must be proven in racial profiling and, more generally, in
selective prosecution cases. See, for example, United States v Armstrong, 517 US 456,
465 (1996) (noting this fundamental rule in a selective prosecution case); Chavez vIllinois
State Police, 251 F3d 612, 635-36 (7th Cir 2001) (noting that an intent to discriminate
must be proven in a racial profiling case); Bradley v United States, 164 F Supp 2d 437,
445 (D NJ 2001), affd, 299 F3d 197 (3d Cir 2002) (holding that a plaintiff must show "that
the difference in treatment was due to Plaintiff's race"). Consider Davis, 426 US at 239
("[Olur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without
regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.") (emphasis in original); Alschuler,
2002 U Chi Legal F at 177 (cited in note 5) ("Under the Supreme Court's decisions, only
purposeful discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause."). While these cases typically involve both Equal Protection Clause and Title VI claims, we will not distinguish
between the two since the standards required to prove discrimination under each are
equivalent. See US Const Amend XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State... deny to any person
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a method of distinguishing between disparate treatment and
disparate impact. We will then analyze a recent Seventh Circuit
case that endorses an earlier version of our model, 12 and suggest
that courts should use the Seventh Circuit's approach when deciding racial profiling cases.
A.

"Disparate Impact" is to "Disparate Treatment" as Search
Rates are to Hit Rates

Disparate impact and disparate treatment are logically and
legally distinct. 3 To distinguish disparate impact from disparate
treatment in policing cases, we use the search rate for a group,
which we define as the number of people in the group searched
divided by the total number of people in the group, and the hit
rate for that group, which we define as the number of successful
searches in that group divided by the number of all searches in
that group.
Consider the following simple thought experiment. Assume
that there are two groups of equal size in the population, Milanese and Sicilians. We say that the Milanese are disparately impacted by the actions of the law enforcement agency whenever
their search rate is greater than that of the Sicilians', which simply means that the police are searching a greater proportion of
Milanese than Sicilians. More generally, a racial group can show
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); US Const Amend V ("[N]or shall
any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."); 42
USC §§ 2000(d)-(d)(7) (2000) (prohibiting recipients of federal funding from discriminating on the basis of race). See also Adarand Constructors,Inc vPena, 515 US 200, 213-18,
224 (1995) (detailing the history of the Fifth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence
and requiring congruence between the analysis under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Alexander v Choate, 469 US 287, 293 (1985) ("Title VI itself directly reached only
instances of intentional discrimination."); GuardiansAssociation v Civil Service Commission, 463 US 582, 610, 612, 642 (1983) (holding that a Title VI claim must include proof of
discriminatory purpose); Rodr4guez v California ff'ghway Patrol,89 F Supp 2d 1131,
1138-39 (N D Cal 2000) (addressing a Title VI claim as part of a racial profiling case);
Chavez v Ilinois State Police, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 11976 (N D Ill Aug 2, 1999), affd, 251
F3d 612 (7th Cir 2001) (same).
12 See Anderson, 355 F3d at 1025, citing Jeff Dominitz, How Do the Laws ofProbability Constrain Legislative and JudicialEfforts to Stop Racial Profiling 5 Am L & Econ
Rev 412 (2003) (extending the analysis in Knowles, Persico and Todd, RacialProfilingin
Motor-Vehicle Searches, 109 J Polit Econ at 227-28 (cited in note 8), and finding that
differences in search rates do not necessarily indicate disparate treatment).
13 The potential breadth of disparate impact not indicating purposeful discrimination
was elucidated by Justice White in 1976 in Davis,426 US at 248 ("A rule [invalidating] a
statute . . . if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would ...
perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that may be more burdensome to the... average black than to the more affluent
white.").
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disparate impact if its members are searched more frequently
than members of another race. In contrast, the proper measure
of disparate treatment,we assert, is a difference in hit rates, not
in search rates. A racial group may be able to demonstrate disparate treatment if their hit rates are significantly lower than that
of other groups. For example, if the search rates for Milanese and
Sicilians were 50 percent each, but searches of Milanese were
successful 70 percent of the time, while those of Sicilians were
successful only 30 percent of the time, we ought to conclude that
the Sicilians are receiving disparate and unfavorable treatment.
Thus, we say that police search practices disparately and unfavorably impact a group when that group's search rate is
greater than the search rate for other groups. Police search practices exhibit disparate and unfavorable treatment of a group
when that group's hit rate is lower than the hit rate for other
groups. In the next Subpart we show that our use of these terms
corresponds to their use in a recent judicial opinion.
B.

Anderson v Cornejo

In Anderson, a group of African-American women challenged
the constitutionality of customs searches performed on them,
pointing to a General Accounting Office ("GAO") study that African-American women were by far the most likely racial group to
be searched at O'Hare Airport in Chicago.14 The study showed
that x-ray search rates for black women were almost twelve
times those of white men and more than eight times those of
white women. 5 Judge Easterbrook held that "[t]hese and similar
data from the GAO's report do not support any constitutional
claim . . .for at least four reasons."' 6 The most relevant to our
model, and to future cases, is the fourth objection, 7 made on the
grounds that "these statistics show disparate impact, not disparate treatment, and the equal protection guarantee is concerned
onlywith the latter.""
14

355 F3d at 1023.

15 United States General Accounting Office, U.S. Customs Service: Better Targeting
ofAirline Passengersfor PersonalSearches Could ProduceBetter Results, GAO/GGD-0038 13 (Mar 2000), available at <http'//www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00038.pdf> (last visited
Apr 13, 2005). We do not pass judgment on the methodology used in this specific study,
but rather focus on how the court viewed the importance of search rates and hit rates in
determining whether the plaintiffs were intentionally discriminated against.
"s Anderson, 355 F3d at 1023.
17 The first three objections relate to the quality of the data collected in that specific
study, id at 1023-24, and are not of broader relevance.
18 Id at 1024 (emphasis added) (explaining that PersonnelAdministrator of Massa-
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The study also showed hit rates of 27.6 percent for black
women, 25.1 percent for white men, 19.5 percent for white
women, 61.6 percent for black men, 58.8 percent for Hispanic
men, and 45.7 percent for Hispanic women. 9 Judge Easterbrook
noted that these data imply that "black women seem to have
been treatedsimilarlyto both white men and white women." 21 He
held that "the success rate of strip searches ... show that Customs officials search black women with (on average) the same
that leads them to search white women or
degree of suspicion
21
white men."

The court's analysis is consistent with our model. First,
Judge Easterbrook declined to use search rates to infer disparate
treatment. 22 Second, he deduced the absence of disparate treatment between different groups from roughly equal hit rates. Indeed, our analysis (detailed below) further suggests that although African-American women received no disparate treatment relative to white men and white women, all three groups
received disparate unfavorable treatment relative to AfricanAmerican men and Hispanic men and Hispanic women.23
We propose that Anderson reflects the best approach for
courts to take when evaluating claims of racial disparities in pochusetts v Feeney,442 US 256 (1979) requires a showing of disparate treatment to demonstrate a violation of the equal protection clause).
'9 Anderson, 355 F3d at 1023.
20 Id (emphasis added).
21 Id at 1024-25. Judge Easterbrook later added that "[i]f about 0.1% of black women
returning from foreign travel are smuggling, and the agents select so carefully that 28%
of those searched are caught with contraband, where's the beef?" Id at 1025.
22 Other courts have also taken the approach that statistical analyses examining
search rates establish only disparate impact, and not different treatment. See, for example, Chavez v llinois State Police, 251 F3d 612, 641 (7th Cir 2001) (questioning the sufficiency of statistics that would show that minority "motorists are stopped at a significantly
higher rate than are white motorists"); Hum v United States, 221 F Supp 2d 493, 501 (D
NJ 2002) (finding that general statistics demonstrating higher search rates for AfricanAmerican women did not demonstrate specific discriminatory intent in the case at hand).
23 The court did not find discrimination for two additional reasons. The first is simply
that the methodological problems with the statistical evidence were sufficient for Judge
Easterbrook to refuse to find discrimination based on it. Anderson, 355 F3d at 1023-24.
The second, which he discusses briefly, is the inframarginality problem caused by the
relative ease with which different groups can be caught. Equal marginal success rates,
which are not measured, will lead to different average success rates, which are measured.
Id at 1025. Although we will not address the question of inframarginality in this paper, it
can be shown that the problem of inframarginality does not arise in the KPT model. See
Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 212-15 (cited in note 8) (detailing how the
KPT model assumes motorists respond to the probability of being searched, thereby testing for prejudice without having data on all the characteristics police use in the decision
to search). In any case, even though the court did not find discrimination on this basis, it
still noted that "[t]he GAO recommended that the Customs Service increase the number
of searches in high-success-rate categories." Anderson, 355 F3d at 1025.
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licing within a policing environment like the one described in
Part 11.24 If a court is satisfied as to the reliability and accuracy
of the statistical evidence,2 5 it can then simply use the hit rates
to determine whether law enforcement officers are treating the
members of a protected class differently and proceed accordingly.
Having outlined the approach the courts should take with respect to the statistical data before it, we will delve into a discussion of the model itself.
II. MODELING POLICE BIAS
The model is adapted from the rational choice model of policing originally developed by Knowles, Persico, and Todd. 26 The
goal of the modeling exercise is to provide a simple test that
would detect the presence of a discriminatory intent based on
statistical evidence of police behavior. The test must be able to
distinguish disparities reflecting discriminatory intent from
those that are inevitably generated in the bona fide pursuit of
crime.

24 We, of course, understand that the Seventh Circuit's opinion is federal law, and
only the law in that circuit. We merely suggest that any court, state or federal, use this

method to decide racial profiling issues, assuming that the standard is intentional discrimination and not simply disparate impact.
25 There is a general recognition that statistical evidence, subject to rebuttal and
cross-examination, can be used to support a discrimination claim. See International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324, 339-40 (1977) (holding that statistical analyses are valid evidence in proving discrimination, but are not irrefutable and
can be rebutted like all other evidence). See also McCieskey vZant, 580 F Supp 338, 36062 (N D Ga 1984) (discussing the specific problems with a statistical model used to prove
discrimination while stating that a sufficiently predictive model would have supported an
inference of discrimination), affd en banc as McCleskey v Kemp, 753 F2d 877 (11th Cir
1985), affd, 481 US 279, 291 n 7, 295 n 15 (1987) (assuming the validity of the study used
by the district court but questioning its applicability where a large number of semiautonomous entities are responsible for setting the challenged policy). However, some
courts have been resistant to using statistical analyses to prove discriminatory intent.
See, for example, McCeskey, 481 US at 293 (1987) ("[S]tatistical proof normally must
present a 'stark' pattern to be accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent under
the Constitution."); Chavez, 251 F3d at 648 (holding that "statistics may not be the sole
proof of a constitutional violation"); Hum, 221 F Supp at 501 ("Statistical data, by itself,
can support an inference of discrimination, but must be coupled with additional evidence
to permit a finding a discriminatory intent."). While we recognize that courts may struggle with whether to use statistical evidence as the sole proof of discrimination, we simply
maintain that if a court uses statistical analyses to decide a racial profiling issue, it
should do so by examining the hit rates rather than the search rates.
26 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 209-15 (cited in note 8).
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A. A Simple Model of Crime, Policing, and Bias
The model in KPT is quite technical, but the key idea behind
it can be expressed simply. Consider a stylized model of narcotics
interdiction on highways. To illustrate the argument, let us assume that the propensity to traffic drugs is a function of one's
socioeconomic status. Assume that high status people have little
incentive to traffic drugs both because they have more lucrative
occupations available to them and because the opportunity cost
of being punished if detected is higher. Lower status people have
worse opportunities and have less to lose if detected. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that a certain fraction of them will
consider trafficking drugs. We assume that the police can distinguish low status people on the basis of their appearance; let us
say, for simplicity, that they wear ragged clothes, whereas high
status people wear fancy clothes." Let us also assume that low
status citizens cannot afford fancy clothes.2"
Assume that we have two equally-sized groups of motorists
which are observably different: Sicilians and Milanese. Let us
assume that Sicilians have a lower socioeconomic status on average. This implies that a larger fraction of them will wear ragged
clothes and will have a higher propensity to carry drugs compared to the Milanese.
Assume that individual police officers are free to tailor their
search strategy as they wish. We assume that police officers are
homogeneous; in other words, they share the same preferences.
Police officers always seek to find drugs, but if police have an
intent to discriminate, then they are also driven by a desire to
harass members of a group, for example, Sicilians. We assume
that unbiased police officers will make decisions about whom to
search only in the pursuit of successful searches. Thus, unbiased
officers will focus their searches on whichever group presents the
highest likelihood of success. Biased police officers, on the other
hand, are assumed also to take pleasure in searching Sicilian
citizens. This means that the biased officer will favor searching
Sicilians even when this group presents a somewhat lower likelihood of success. The extent to which a biased officer is willing to
trade a decreased likelihood of success for the pleasure of search27

To keep the analysis streamlined, we simplify the model as much as possible. The

same is true at several points in this Part. The model can be made more realistic, at the
cost of additional space and complexity.
28 This assumption is not necessary for our results and could be relaxed, but it simplifies the analysis. We return to this point in Part II-D below.
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ing Sicilians represents a measure of the intensity of the officer's
bias.
We have modeled intent to discriminate as bias: if officers
are biased against Sicilians they will indulge their bias and
search Sicilians, unless searching Milanese presents a distinctly
higher likelihood of success. In contrast, unbiased officers will
search whomever presents the highest probability of success.
Thus, we should expect Sicilians to be searched more intensely if
the police are biased, or in other words, have an intent to discriminate.
The goal of the analysis is to infer intent to discriminate
from statistical data of police behavior. To this end, we need to
predict how an unbiased police force would behave, how a biased
one would behave, and then use the data to distinguish the two
patterns of behavior. The available data are the number of Sicilian and Milanese citizens searched and the outcome of the
searches (whether drugs were found). The data, however, do not
record the sartorial appearance of those searched.
B.

Difficulties with Using Search Rate Disparity to Detect Bias

Perhaps our first instinct is to look at the search patterns.
After all, we know that, ceteris paribus, a biased police officer is
more likely to search a Sicilian than a Milanese. So, we might be
tempted to infer intent to discriminate by comparing search rates
of Sicilians and Milanese. This approach, however, is flawed. Indeed, recall that we assumed that a higher fraction of Sicilians
have a propensity to commit a crime. This means that, ceteris
paribus, criminals will be more frequent among Sicilians than
among Milanese. Thus, even if the police have no discriminatory
intent and are unable to distinguish between Sicilians and Milanese, but are capable of observing which motorists were criminals, Sicilians will end up being searched more frequently. Such
search behavior would entail a disparate impact, but, coming
from "ethnic-blind" police, would not be considered evidence of
intent to discriminate.
The argument shows that a certain amount of disparate impact might simply reflect the goal-oriented behavior of individual
police officers pursuing crime in the presence of heterogeneous
groups. On the other hand, an "excessive" amount of disparate
impact might also reflect a discriminatory intent against Sicilians. Determining whether the disparity is excessive requires
data on the fraction of individuals per population that a conscientious, unbiased police officer should have deemed suspicious
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enough, based on the evidence at the officer's disposal, to warrant a search. In practice, this type of evidence is almost surely
not available, and even if it were available, it would be extremely
contentious because it would require the court to make a determination as to the degree of suspicion warranted by any number
of investigative clues.
Worse yet, the degree of suspicion warranted by a certain set
of characteristics is itself endogenous, in other words, it is a function of police behavior. If, for example, the police rarely searched
individuals wearing ragged clothes, these individuals will be
tempted to carry drugs. In this case, ragged clothes would
warrant suspicion. But if the police, perhaps at the behest of a
judge, were to intensify the search of individuals with ragged
clothes, these individuals would probably be deterred, or they
would invest in disguising their appearance, and thus ragged
clothes would become a non-suspicious indicator.2 9
These difficulties illustrate, in a nutshell, the controversy
over racial profiling. The argument demonstrates why disparate
impact is not and should not be per se evidence of an intent to
discriminate. Rather, the disparate impact might simply reflect
the goal-oriented behavior of individual police officers pursuing
crime. On the other hand, an "excessive" amount of disparate
impact might also reflect a discriminatory intent against Sicilians. Since determining whether the disparate impact is excessive is very difficult in practice, analysis of disparate impact
alone cannot guide an inquiry into how to detect intent to discriminate.
C.

Advantages of Using Hit Rate Disparity to Detect Bias

Our contention is that, within our model, the intent to discriminate can be ascertained easily, not by looking at the disparity in search rates, but by looking at the disparity in hit rates.
We will show that, in equilibrium, there is no disparity in hit
rates if and only if the police are unbiased. In other words, the
disparity in hit rates provides a simple, bright line test for the
presence of intent to discriminate.
To understand the above statement, it is necessary to understand what we mean by "in equilibrium." In a rational choice
model such as ours, behavior is dictated by the preferences of
29

In a more complex model, even race could be "disguised." For example, an individ-

ual could hire a courier of a different race, which effectively would serve to disguise his or
her race.
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agents, in this model citizens and police officers. The rational
choice approach assumes that agents choose their behavior to
maximize their utility. The effectiveness of one actor's particular
course of action depends on what every other actor is doing.
When each agent behaves in a way that maximizes her utility
given what all other agents are doing, we say that we are in equilibrium.
Our strategy for finding the equilibrium is to start from a polar allocation that is clearly not in equilibrium: we start by assuming that the police utility is not maximized. We then imagine
a notional adjustment process where, one by one, police are allowed to change their behavior. Rational police will take the opportunity to change their behavior if that improves their utility.
When no additional improvement can be obtained, the adjustment process will come to a rest and equilibrium will have been
reached.
Assume for now that the police are unbiased. Let us start
out from a polar allocation in which the police only search Milanese, and not Sicilians. Furthermore, let us assume that the police
will only search Milanese with ragged clothes because the police
assume that Milanese with fancy clothes will almost never carry
drugs.
If the police will only search Milanese with ragged clothes,
we can conclude that the crime rate will be lower among Milanese with ragged clothes than among the Sicilians because the
Milanese expect to be searched with high probability. Among the
Sicilians with ragged clothes, the crime rate will be high because
these citizens do not expect to be searched at all. This is not a
stable outcome, however, because unbiased officers can get a
higher likelihood of success-a higher hit rate-by searching Sicilians with ragged clothes instead of Milanese. Thus, officers
who are allowed to change their behavior will switch to searching
Sicilians with ragged clothes.3 ° This switch will cause the crime
rate among Milanese to increase a little bit, while among Sicilians with ragged clothes the crime rate will go down a little bit.
Still, unbiased police prefer to search Sicilians with ragged
clothes, who still have a higher hit rate. The adjustment process
therefore continues until no unbiased officer wants to search Si-

30

We assume implicitly that the police are aware of the hit rates in different groups.

See the empirical results discussed in Part III, where the observed equalization of the hit
rates appears consistent with this assumption.
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cilians over Milanese, that is, when the hit rate is the same for
Sicilians with ragged clothes and Milanese with ragged clothes.
Let us now examine the adjustment process when the police
are biased against Sicilians. What will be the equilibrium? Starting from the original polar allocation where only Milanese are
searched, the adjustment process will unfold much like in the
previous case, except that the process will not come to a rest
when the hit rates are the same between the Sicilians and Milanese. Police will still switch to searching Sicilians with ragged
clothes because biased police derive an extra measure of utility
from harassing Sicilians. In order for the adjustment process to
come to a rest, the hit rate needs to be lower for the Sicilians
than for the Milanese citizens who are searched. The adjustment
process comes to a rest when the difference in hit rates exactly
offsets the bias. At equilibrium, therefore, the disparity in hit
rates reflects the size of the police bias.
This simple thought experiment shows that the hit rates between Sicilians and Milanese searched should be the same if the
police lack intent to discriminate. Note that the search rate may
well be higher among Sicilians, especially if, as in our example,
individuals with ragged clothes are more common among Sicilians. However, we have demonstrated that there is an easy way
to check if that disparity reflects an intent to discriminate. If the
police intend to discriminate against Sicilians, the hit rate will
be lower among the Sicilians who are searched than among the
Milanese who are searched. In other words, there will be a disparity in hit rates. Absent a disparity in hit rates, any disparity
in search rates must be ascribed to the heterogeneity across
groups (in our example, the fraction of citizens with ragged
clothes).
D. Discussion
The analysis of our model yields a bright line test: intent to
discriminate is detected from the disparity in hit rates across
protected groups. In the presence of intent to discriminate, there
will also be an unjustified disparate impact across protected
groups, i.e., there will be discriminatory effect.
The reader may wonder how much the assumptions of our
model can be relaxed, thereby making the model more realistic,
while still retaining the validity of the hit rates test. The model
can be extended considerably, for example, to accommodate any
number of protected categories (instead of only Sicilians and
Milanese) and of subgroups (instead of only ragged- and fancy-
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clothed). The bias can also be modeled differently, for example,
as an extra preference for detecting guilty members of a protected group instead of simply for searching them. Finally, one
can also allow for mutable characteristics, namely, for characteristics that can be changed at a cost. For example, one can allow a
potential criminal the option to disguise himself to reduce the
probability of being searched. In our model, this would mean allowing the ragged-clothed citizens to invest in fancy clothes to
reduce the probability of detection." Yet even after adding all
these features in order to make the model more realistic, the basic test remains intact: any intent to discriminate against a
group translates into lower hit rates on that group in equilibrium."
III. THE MARYLAND CASE STUDY

To illustrate how the methodology would be applied in a
court case, we report the results of statistical analyses carried
out on data collected by the police as a result of the settlement
agreement and consent decree in Wilkins v Maryland State Police.3 The settlement entailed the payment of money to the
plaintiff, the formulation of a statement by the police renouncing
racial profiling, and the collection of the data presented here.34
The tables reported in this Part are based on the analysis originally performed in KPT, which is based on data from 1,590 vehicular searches performed between January 1995 and 1999 on a
stretch of 1-95 in Maryland.35 We also report the findings of subsequent analyses performed by Gross and Barnes (2002)36 and by

Barnes 37 that use larger and more up-to-date data sets on Maryland State Police stops and searches, and discuss the interpretations that they offer for their findings.
31 In a more realistic model, this would include the ability to hire a courier of another
race. See note 29.
32 See Nicola Persico and Petra Todd, Using Hit Rates Tests for Racial Bias in Law
Enforcement: Vehicle Searches in Wichita (NBER Working Paper 10947, 2004), available
at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10947> (last visited Apr 13, 2005).
33 Consent Decree Dated Apr 2, 2003, Wilkins v MarylandState Police, Civil Action
No CCB-93-468 (D Md 2003).
34 Id at 9 (referring to Settlement Agreement included in the Consent Decree as Attachment A).
35 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 215 (cited in note 8).
36 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 653 (cited in note 3).
37 Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent Racial Profiling *2-6 (Oct 8, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with

authors).
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A first look at the data reveals a familiar pattern of disparate impact. Table 1 reveals that, of those searched, 63 percent
were African-Americans, unquestionably a much higher percentage than the fraction of African-American motorists on the road.
We also note that men are disproportionately more likely to be
searched than women (93 percent of those searched are men).
Other features of the data, while of lesser interest because not
directly related to protected categories, are still instructive about
police behavior. For example, older vehicles represent 22 percent
of all searches, luxury vehicles 8 percent, third-party vehicles 18
percent, and 31 percent of searches were made at night. Many
searches resulted in marijuana finds (23 percent), while 8 percent resulted in cocaine finds.
The first two rows in Table 2 report the hit rates by race. Of
the white motorists searched, 32 percent possessed illegal drugs.
Of the African-American motorists searched, 34 percent possessed illegal drugs. Despite the wide disparity in search rates,
hit rates are very close. In fact, a Pearson chi-square test cannot
reject the hypothesis that the two hit rates are the same. 31 According to our analysis, this suggests that the police have no intent to discriminate against African-Americans.3 9 To see why, let
us apply the logic of our model to this case. Presumably, police
officers are aware or assume that, at the current status quo, the
hit rates are approximately the same from searching the two
groups (whites and African-Americans). Then, a biased officer
would know that switching some of her searches to AfricanAmericans would allow her to indulge in her prejudice at no cost
in terms of success rate. Thus, if officers were biased, they would
switch from the status quo towards searching more AfricanAmericans, and this process would continue until the AfricanAmerican hit rate were sufficiently lower than the white hit rate
that the bias was offset. But in the data we cannot reject the hypothesis that the hit rate is the same for whites and African-

38

The p-value is 0.33.

39 For Hispanics, however, the hit rate (not reported in Table 2, infra) is lower, possi-

bly indicating a bias against Hispanics. An alternative explanation for this finding could
be that Hispanics are more likely to be "mules," in other words, to transport high-value
shipments of drugs not for personal use. To address this issue, one can perform more
sophisticated, though somewhat more subjective, analyses based on the quantities of
drugs found. See Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 224-27 (cited in note 8)
(applying an alternative analysis to the original data, where the definition of "a successful
search" is based on four different categories of "guilt," each of which is determined by the
quantity of drugs with which an individual is found).
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Americans. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
police are not biased.
The next two rows ask the same question with regards to
sex. Again, despite the wide disparity in search rates, hit rates
are very close and the chi-square test does not reject the hypothesis that the two hit rates are the same.4" According to our
analysis, this suggests that the police have no intent to discriminate against women.
The remaining rows compare hit rates along other dimensions, such as the time of day at which the search occurred, the
age of the car, etc. Hit rates are similar across these dimensions,
too.4 1 That this similarity in hit rates is found consistently across
a variety of characteristics is particularly remarkable in light of
the wide disparity in search rates. The equalization of hit rates is
exactly what our model would predict when the police are unbiased and are pursuing a search strategy that maximizes the
probability of a successful search. Thus, the fact that hit rates
are equalized in our data suggests that our model of police behavior accurately approximates the actual behavior of the Maryland State Police, at least the part of it that is represented in our
data. As an important corollary, the evidence suggests that the
disparity in search rates between African-Americans and whites
does not reflect an intent to discriminate on the part of the police.
Gross and Barnes (2002) as well as Barnes analyze data obtained from the Maryland State Police.4 2 Using larger data sets,43
they report similar findings concerning the relative similarity in
hit rates across races.' Barnes, in particular, reports the same
striking absence of disparity in hit rates reported in our data.45
Gross and Barnes (2002), however, come to the conclusion that
the behavior of the Maryland State Police is not likely to be
40

The p-value is 0.37.

41 The only time that the Pearson test rejects equality of hit rates is for luxury cars,

which are somewhat less likely to result in a find. According to our model, this indicates
some preference on the part of the police for searching luxury cars. It is interesting, however, that the disparity disappears when we focus on "large" drug finds. See Knowles,
Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 226 (cited in note 8).
42 See Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactualat *38 (cited in note 38); Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 653 (cited in note 3).
43 Their data sets subsume those used in KPT.
44 See Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 669, Table 8 (cited in note 3) (finding
that the hit rates for "[aill [d]rugs" were similar for whites and African-Americans).
45 See Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactualat *40, Table 4 (cited in note 38). We
note that the hit rates in Barnes are computed as a fraction of stops and not, as in KPT,
of searches. Moreover, Table 4 restricts attention to hit of "hard drugs." Id.
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found permissible by the courts.46 In our reading of their argument, these authors do not argue that police behavior suggests
bias. In fact, we note that these authors point out that the police
are primarily motivated by the desire to maximize the capture of
drugs and drug traffickers.4 7 They argue, however, that in so doing, the police choose whom to stop on the basis of race." These
authors do not consider the possibility that the police use other
characteristics in deciding whom to stop, and that these
characteristics simply happen to be correlated with race. We find
this possibility to be entirely plausible, although we know of no
evidence speaking to this issue. In the absence of evidence on
this specific point, and in the presence of evidence that the police
are unbiased, we think the prima facie argument for intent to
discriminate cannot be successfully established. As we suggested,
we believe that the argument for intent to discriminate instead
must be made based on the disparity in hit rates, if such a disparity exists.
CONCLUSION

The legal approach to using statistics to prove racial profiling has been somewhat muddled, largely because there has been
no bright-line test of how to interpret such statistical evidence to
infer the existence, or nonexistence, of intentional discrimination. Proving intent has long been a crucial part of the law, for
mere disparate impact could occur even in the absence of bias.
We have shown that statistical evidence can be used to show intent, provided that it is analyzed properly and under a model
with strong economic underpinnings. Our analysis shows that hit
rates, and not search rates, are the key variables necessary to
prove intent to discriminate within our policing model. The intuition from the analysis extends to "auditing" environments, such
as customs searches,49 in which it is meaningful to talk about hit
rates.
In order to combat racial discrimination in policing, we must
assess the extent to which police work is tainted by racial bias.
46 See Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 737-38, 744 (cited in note 3) (claiming
that courts increasingly do not want to hear that officers have been making stops on the
basis of race). It must be pointed out that Gross and Barnes could not foresee the decision
in Anderson.
47 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 753 (cited in note 3).

48

Id.

See Anderson, 355 F3d at 1023-25 (analyzing the constitutionality of racial disparities in customs searches).
49
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This paper has proposed a rigorous empirical methodology, based
on recent advances in economic analysis, for detecting bias in
police interdiction. The bright-line test we propose is consistent
with the doctrinal approach espoused by the Seventh Circuit in
Anderson.
It is our hope that courts, practitioners, and experts will look
to this methodology when evaluating the merits of racial profiling claims in drug interdiction cases, which affect not just highway stops, but customs as well. By using this approach to find
whether or not there is intentional discrimination, the court system can mete out true justice for all of the parties involved.
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TABLE 1

Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Analysis
(standard error of the mean shown in parentheses)
All

ByRace

BySex

Obs.
AfricanAmerican

Hisp.

White

Other

Female

Male

AfricanAmerican

0.63
(0.01)

1.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.64
(0.04)

0.63
(0.01)

White

0.29
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

1.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.35
(0.04)

0.29
(0.02)

Hispanic

0.06
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)

1.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.07
(0.01)

Female

0.07
(0.01)

0.07
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)

0.09
(0.01)

0.30
(0.05)

1.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Cocaine

0.08
(0.01)

0.10
(0.01)

0.03
(0.02)

0.04
(0.01)

0.15
(0.08)

0.09
(0.03)

0.08
(0.01)

Marijuana

0.23
(0.01)

0.23
(0.01)

0.04
(0.02)

0.26
(0.02)

0.20
(0.09)

0.21
(0.04)

0.23
(0.01)

Crack
Cocaine

0.04
(0.01)

0.05
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

0.01
(.004)

0.05
(0.05)

0.06
(0.02)

0.04
(0.01

Heroin

0.02
(.004)

0.02
(.004)

0.03
(0.02)

0.03
(0.01)

0.05
(0.05)

0.06
(0.02)

0.02
(.003)

Morphine

0.001
(.001)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.002
(.002)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.001
(.001)

Other Drugs

0.01
(.003)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.01
(0.01)

0.01
(.003)

Paraphernalia

0.01
(.002)

0.003
(0.002)

0.010
(0.01)

0.02
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)

0.01
(0.01)

0.007
(.002)

Older Vehicle
(10 years
or older)
Luxury Model

0.22
(0.011)

0.20
(0.013)

0.247
(0.044)

0.28
(0.021)

0.20
(0.092)

0.18
(0.036)

0.23
(0.011)

0.08
(.007)

0.10
(0.01)

0.09
(0.03)

0.05
(0.05)

0.05
(0.01)

0.08
(.025)

0.08
(.007)

Third party
vehicle

0.18
(0.010)

0.22
(0.013)

0.25
(0.044)

0.09
(0.014)

0.20
(0.092)

0.20
(0.027)

0.18
(0.010)

Night
(12am-6am)

0.31
(0.01)

0.35
(0.02)

0.44
(0.05)

0.23
(0.02)

0.25
(0.10)

0.35
(0.04)

0.43
(0.01)

Numberof
Observations

1590

1007

97

466

20

117

1473
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TABLE 2
Proportion of Vehicles Searched Found to be Carrying Drugs
Guilty #1
(includes drugs
in any amount)
African-American
White

0.34
0.32

Guilty #2
< 2 grams)
.26
.21

Guilty #3
(excludes
maiuana in
any amount)
.16
.07

.22
.14

.19
.11

(ercludes

Male
Female
Day
Night
Luxury
Not Luxury
Older Car
(>= 10 years old)
Newer Car
(< 10 years old)

Third party vehicle

.29

Own vehicle

.33

Guilty #4
(Felony)

F:-M--l

